

# Rollback Eradication of TB from Wildlife in NZ

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Landcare Research



@EcolModAG



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



# Bovine TB

- A global cattle disease that can infect humans
- Caused by *Mycobacterium bovis*
- Spreads by breath, saliva, raw meat and milk
- In NZ, often spreads to possums, feral pigs, ferrets, wild deer...



- Goals under National Pest Management Plan (v4)





# Eradicating TB from Wildlife


Pest control to **break main TB cycle in wildlife**

- Mainly possums
- Ferrets in some areas (Central Otago)



# Why Control Possums?


- Possums can maintain TB at high densities





# Why Control Possums?


- Infected possums die






# Why Control Possums?

- But not before they have infected others




# Why Control Possums?

- TB is maintained




# Why Control Possums?

- Herd can become re-infected from possums
- Curious cows lick dead possums covered with TB pus



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# Why Control Possums?

- But if possum numbers are reduced...



# Why Control Possums?



- But if possum numbers are reduced...
- TB cannot be sustained and dies out




# Spatially-explicit Individual-Based-Model of possum and TB disease dynamics



# Breaking the TB Cycle

- Simulate control activities to determine effect on TB persistence
- Suppress possums to low levels for 10-15 years ( $< 1/\text{ha}$ )
- TB cannot be sustained







## Refining Control

- Type of control – trapping vs aerial 1080
- Number and frequency of controls
- Spacing of trap & bait lines
- Empirical testing of predictions





# Surveillance to Prove Freedom

- Wildlife surveillance to **prove absence**

1. Detect, trap and test possums for TB
2. Inspect and test other animals
  - pigs, ferrets, deer



# Surveillance to Prove Freedom

- Find TB?
  - do more control!
- Don't find any TB?
  - **Truly gone?**
  - Or
  - **Didn't look hard enough?**



Absence of Evidence  
 $\neq$   
Evidence of Absence



# Probability of Freedom

Our conclusion depends on:

1. How confident we were that no TB remains in possums **before** looking.
2. How hard did we look?
3. How confident do we want to be in declaring wildlife is TB free

$$PoF = \frac{Prior}{1 - (SSe(1 - Prior))}$$

**Prior:** Prior probability TB is absent

**SSe:** System-level sensitivity -  
chance of finding TB if present

**PoF:** Posterior probability of  
freedom





Thomas Bayes  
1701-1761



# PoF Framework

- 1. Setting a Prior



- Disease history
- Control history
- Decision tree



**Prior**  
Prob. TB eliminated


# PoF Framework

## 2. Sensitivity from Surveillance

- i. Test proportion of population for TB
- ii. - Calculate chance of finding TB if present,
  - Proportion tested ( $n/N$ )
  - Accuracy of test ( $SeTest$ )
  - Design prevalence ( $m$ )



$$SSe_{Pop} = 1 - \left(1 - SeTest \frac{n}{N}\right)^m$$






# PoF Framework

## 2. Sensitivity from surveillance

- Based on spatial arrangement of devices
- Need to know animal home range size and detectability


# SSe

If TB possums were present, what is chance we would detect TB



## Sentinels

- Pigs: Spill-over hosts
- Great at 'finding' TB
- Highly infectious, with large home range
- Ferrets: moderate home range, but less infectious
- Deer: large HR, low infection rate





## PoF Framework


3. Combine Prior and SSe to get...



$$PFree = \frac{Prior}{1 - (SSe(1 - Prior))}$$


# PFree

Probability area is  
free of TB given TB  
not detected  
 $Pr(TB-|S-)$



- Surveillance is difficult and very costly in some regions

## Control then Surveillance



- Do survey to prove TB at low levels  
**then**  
control to eliminate all infected possums


## Surveillance then Control



# Surveillance then Control: Hokonui Hills



Remote central  
c.6500 ha bush  
area not  
intensively  
surveyed since  
2006





# Surveillance then Control: Hokonui Hills



**$SSe = 0.10$**




$n=426$  possums

$N = c.4200$





**>95% kill**

- Aerial control





# Too much surveillance? Know when to walk away



- Correct decision made
  - No TB, therefore **no consequences**
    - 95% of time (?)
- Incorrectly declare freedom
  - TB remains therefore will have to **re-control**
    - 5% of time (?)






## Stopping Rule

### Surveillance costs

- 100% chance of incurring

### Re-control


- Cost \* Chance of incurring
- Socio-political costs




Target stopping threshold

# Stopping Rule

Depends on habitat related factors




If re-control is \$\$,  
stop later



If surveillance is \$\$,  
stop earlier

## Livestock as Sentinels


- Absence of TB in livestock provides info on TB absence in **wildlife**
- Especially useful for assurance phase



# Ferrets as a Host?!

1. 1990s: TB in ferrets where possum abundance was high

**TB in ferrets was spill-over from possums**



*Caley, P. (1998). NZ Veterinary Journal, 46: 157-162.*




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2. But transmits between captive ferrets

**Ferret to ferret infection?**



A wild-caught female ferret scavenging a male ferret carcass.


# Ferrets as a Host?!



## 3. 2000s: TB rare in possums

- 182 possum TB surveys in areas with 5+ yrs good control
- 100,000 post mortems – no TB

**Possum TB rare absent from most farmland**




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
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
### 4. 2000s: TB not rare in ferrets

- 417 ferret TB surveys
- 35,000 ferrets, 406 TB+

**Is TB cycling in ferrets after eradicated from possums?**



# Current research



## Possums:

- Low density (0.02/ha)
- No TB

## Ferrets:

- Variable density
  - $<1/\text{km}^2$  in west
  - **$4/\text{km}^2$  in central east**
- TB prevalence 3.5%
  - All TB in east

⇒ Supports TB persistence  
in ferrets without possum  
spillover



Benmore VCZ





# The End is in Sight

Well on the way to TB eradication from NZ




From 1700  
to 26 herds




From 10.4  
million ha to  
<7.5m



656 INFECTED  
HERDS  
JULY 2000



26  
INFECTED HERDS  
JULY 2019



● Infected Herds  
● Vector Risk Areas



# Lessons learned

- Partnerships are key:
  - OSPRI funding sound science
  - Evidence based technical decisions
- Good team
  - Strong leadership
  - Diverse skills
- Continual improvement
- Coordinated & systematic approach



Dr. Paul Livingstone  
Research Manager (Retired)



Dr. Graham Nugent  
Research Area Leader



Dean Anderson, Mandy Barron,  
Grant Morriss, Ivor Yockney,  
Bruce Warburton, Graham  
Nugent, Dave Morgan, Peter  
Sweetapple (absent)

# Beyond TB

- PoF framework applied to pest eradication



- Other wildlife disease opportunities

African Swine Fever  
in 2014



Monday, 21 April 2016  
**Avian malaria increases  
penguin deaths**

By Hannah's Blog.com  
Regions - World Stage



**Dolphins and infectious  
diseases: a story of  
toxoplasmosis**



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